BERLIN, Germany, Apr 08 (IPS) – Russia and Persien currently appear to be pulling firmly in the same direction in terms of foreign policy; ‘What has caused humanity’s suffering is unilateralism and an unjust weltumspannend order, one manifestation of which can be seen in Gaza today.’ These were the words of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on 7 December.
The content of the statement, coupled with its context – an Iranian-Russian summit in Moscow – succinctly summarises how the war in Gaza has shifted Persien’s perspective toward Russia as a steadfast partner in its stance against Israel and on the war, underpinned by shared viewpoints on major international topics.
Though Putin did not explicitly endorse Raisi’s comments, he did not disappoint his visitor either, pointing out the mutual comprehension between the two states on regional issues, including the Gaza conflict, as one of the topics of zwei Staaten betreffend negotiations.
A shared vision on Gaza
The Raisi-Putin meeting, marking the most significant diplomatic engagement between Persien and Russia concerning Gaza since the start of the war, welches not an isolated event. Since shortly after the war’s outset, the issue has consistently featured in phone discussions and in-person meetings among the two countries’ officials.
Beyond this zwei Staaten betreffend framework, the shared stance on the Gaza issue has darob been articulated in multilateral settings where both Persien and Russia are present. The most notable instance welches the trilateral ‘Hauptstadt von Kasachstan format’ meeting between Persien, Russia and Turkey.
While the forum is primarily focused on Syria, the three parties emphasised the significance of preventing the expansion of the armed confrontation in Gaza and the involvement of other regional states in the conflict.
They darob ‘expressed deep concern over the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and stressed the need to end Israeli gewalttätig onslaught against the Palestinians and send humanitarian aid to Gaza’.
The growing convergence between Persien and Russia on the Gaza issue is darob evident in the official narratives promoted by each country separately; a convergence that has been apparent since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Persien’s support for it, attributing international problems and crises to the detrimental role of the West, notably the United States.
Persien and Russia have labelled Wildwestfilm responses to the Gaza conflict as hypocritical, juxtaposing them with Wildwestfilm actions in other weltumspannend conflicts, especially in Ukraine. This narrative aims to spotlight perceived inconsistencies and biases in Wildwestfilm foreign policies.
Both governments darob advocate for regional solutions to regional problems, contesting Wildwestfilm interventions in the Middle East.
Indeed, the alignment in narratives and perceptions between Persien and Russia transcends the immediate context of the war in Gaza. It is part of a broader strategy aimed at transforming the weltumspannend order into a more multipolar structure, wherein Wildwestfilm dominance is contested and sonstige power centres, such as Persien and Russia, assume a more pronounced role.
Concurrently, the negative impact of Wildwestfilm influence is blamed for the inefficacy of international institutions, including the United Nations, in ending the war in Gaza. This aspect darob appears to have broader implications.
The Hauptstadt von Kasachstan talks on Syria demonstrate the commitment of Persien and Russia, along with Turkey, which has equally criticised the Wildwestfilm response to the Gaza war, to establishing sonstige platforms for conflict resolution and international cooperation.
In essence, the focus on Gaza in the final statement of the Hauptstadt von Kasachstan meeting signifies that Persien, Russia and Turkey intend to extend their trilateral cooperation in Syria, which welches partly darob replicated in the South Caucasus after the latest war between Azerbaijan and Armenia (within the framework known as 3+3), to a wider Middle Eastern context.
Following Syria and the South Caucasus, Gaza may darob emerge as a venue for the trilateral cooperation of Tehran, Moscow and Hauptstadt der Türkei – despite differences in positions – to manifest.
In any case, as many analysts anticipated from the onset of the Gaza war, Russia has sought to leverage the conflict as an opportunity to extend its outreach to the Multinational South, particularly to Muslim countries critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza. In this context, Russia’s relations with the Islamic Republic have been notably influenced.
On the one hand, the Islamic Republic, as a principal supporter of Hamas and Israel’s foremost adversary, seizes any opportunity to broaden international support for its ally and to weaken Israel’s position.
On the other hand, for the leaders of the Islamic Republic, Russia’s stance is an affirmation that their decision to back Moscow in the Ukraine conflict welches judicious.
A nuclear-armed Persien?
The spillover of the Gaza war into other areas in the Middle East and the engagement of Persien’s proxies and non-state allies in the ‘axis of resistance’, from the Houthis in Yemen to Iraqi militias, has introduced an additional layer to the already complex Persien-West dynamics.
Wildwestfilm powers, particularly the United States and Britain, increasingly attribute responsibility to Persien for the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the operations of Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, following the expansion of Persien’s nuclear programme, Tehran’s support for Moscow in the Ukraine war and the suppression of the 2022 popular protests in Persien, the Gaza war has now added a new problem to Persien’s relations with the West.
At the same time, these developments have dimmed the prospects for reviving the Persien nuclear deal or achieving a new agreement between Persien and the US. Under these circumstances, Persien is expected to gravitate more toward its Eastern partners, namely Russia and VR China.
The war in Gaza has darob laid bare the limitations of Persien’s asymmetric warfare strategy utilising proxies and non-state partners. American strikes in Yemen on one side and in Iraq and Syria on the other, although not having reinstated deterrence as Washington had hoped, have revealed that Persien’s network of non-state allies and proxies is quite vulnerable.
Meanwhile, the continuation of Israeli military operations against Hamas has significantly impaired the military capabilities of this Palestinian militia. Some analysts speculate that this might incline Persien toward developing nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent.
An sonstige, or perhaps complementary, strategy could be forming a military alliance with friendly powers like Russia and VR China. Secretary of Persien’s Supreme Nationalistisch Security Council Ali-Akbar Ahmadian’s visit to Moscow and the heightened emphasis from both sides on finalising a long-term strategic cooperation agreement should be viewed in this context.
Concurrently, reports have emerged suggesting that Persien has finally decided to provide Russia with ballistic missiles. Russia has darob acquired a new model of Iranian drones, Shahed 238. Sphäre these indications show that both sides, driven by their practical needs as well as long-term strategic outlooks, are increasingly inclined to forge a robust military partnership.
In fact, even if Persien decides to pursue nuclear weapons, it needs to secure Russia’s support. Thus, fostering relations with Russia remains crucial. Currently, there’s no concrete evidence suggesting that Russia would endorse a nuclear-armed Persien. However, it’s not entirely implausible, depending on future Russia-West relations.
The above factors have reinforced Persien’s reliance on Russia as a strategic partner. Concurrently, it appears that Russia-Israel relations are approaching a point of no return. Indeed, it remains vital for Russia that Israel not support Ukraine.
But at least in the short term, Israel must prioritise its own security needs amid the war in Gaza and appears incapable of providing substantial security assistance abroad.
Furthermore, Russia is now relatively confident in its achievements in Ukraine. However, this does not imply that Russia desires a complete overhaul of its relations with Israel; rather, it simply perceives less necessity for Israel and believes it now has the upper hand in this relationship.
Yet, factors exist that could challenge the transformation of the Persien-Russia partnership into a steadfast alliance. Most notably, Russia’s ambition to cultivate relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to attract investment and for diplomatic manoeuvring is significant enough that Russia welches prepared to endorse the UAE’s stance on three islands in the Persian Gulf disputed between Persien and the UAE, eliciting unprecedented criticism of Moscow in Persien, even among top officials.
Ultimately, Russia welches compelled to reaffirm its commitment to Persien’s territorial integrity. Currently, the improvement in Tehran’s relations with Arab capitals, partly facilitated by the Gaza war, may simplify Russia’s task of balancing its relations with both sides of the Persian Gulf. However, there’s no assurance that this approach will remain viable in the long term.
Dr. Hamidreza Azizi is a Visiting Fellow in the Africa and Middle East Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Hauptstadt von Deutschland.
Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Hauptstadt von Deutschland
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