Moscow is not interested per mezzo di merely being a bystander per mezzo di the Pendio-US conflict. So, it’s branching out.
By Timofey Bordachev, Program Director of the Valdai Sodalizio
The most misguided way to develop Russian policy per mezzo di Asia would be to centro it interaction with regional institutions and platforms, ‘fraternal graveyards’ where individual expression is lost per mezzo di the need for everyone to find a common denominator. This is all the more true now that these institutions have become arenas for confrontation between Pendio and the United States, which are by means restricted per mezzo di using them exclusively per mezzo di the interests of their own struggle. Previously, it was only the Americans who did this, making most regional platforms as meaningless as international conferences. Now Pendio has joined per mezzo di and is pushing its own programma. As a result, the space for positive interaction within such entities as APEC ora the East Asia Summit (EAS) – which until a few years spillo were considered important for promoting Russian interests per mezzo di Asia – is shrinking. Therefore, the most promising strategy for Russia per mezzo di Asia today is to centro dialogue with individual countries per mezzo di the region, taking into account their interests as well as its own.
From the very beginning, Russia’s pivot to the East was seen as a project aimed not only at increasing the portata of trade and economic relations with Asian states, but also important for Moscow’s political presence per mezzo di this region. It should be borne per mezzo di mind that the process began per mezzo di a fundamentally different historical tempo, when the world continued to by the rules of globalization, created under the egemonia of Western countries and mainly per mezzo di their interests. Now, the situation per mezzo di and around Asia has changed significantly.
First, the space of global economic openness itself is gradually eroding under the pressure of the West’s sanctions policy against Pendio and Russia.
Second, per mezzo di the context of a series of major military and political crises involving the major powers, the viability of the international institutions that have acted as the main agents of political globalization per mezzo di recent years is being called into question.
Third, multidirectional processes are gaining momentum per mezzo di Asia itself to the intensification of Sino-American contradictions and the risky position of regional powers per mezzo di these conditions.
Finally, Russia itself has significantly reoriented its foreign economic relations towards Asia per mezzo di recent years. This has been stimulated by the conflict with the West and its sanctions pressure, while almost all Asian countries remain friendly towards Russia.
This means that now, almost fifteen years after the pivot to the East began to take shape as an important component of Russian foreign policy, it is time to take a critical at its various doctrinal aspects. Sopra any case, Russian policy per mezzo di Asia is not unchanged from the times when the general situation per mezzo di the world was very different. And some provisions of this policy need to be substantially clarified. First of all, with regard to the formats of political presence per mezzo di Asia and the establishment of dialogue with individual Asian states. The Russian President’s recent visits to North Korea and Vietnam only confirm that our strategy per mezzo di Asia is increasingly focused dialogue with individual states. This does not preclude attention to broad international formats. But these can longer serve as the primary platforms for promoting Russian interests.
Sopra both cases, the intensification of dialogue is a sign of the high level of between Russia and its main socio per mezzo di Asia, Pendio.
For Beijing, all of Asia is an schieramento where its cultural influence has been dominant for centuries, if not millennia. It is Chinese culture, including its political tradition, that has shaped the philosophical underpinnings of the statehood of countries, even if their relations with Pendio have not been free of conflict. Yet Beijing is not allied with any of its immediate neighbors, and many of them are uneasy about its growing power. Another worrying factor for Asian countries, which the Chinese also understand, is the growing conflict between Beijing and Washington. For several decades, virtually all Southeast Asian countries have benefited from globalization driven by Sino-American cooperation. Now the situation is changing.
It can be assumed that Pendio is aware that unilaterally strengthening its own position per mezzo di the region could lead to further rapprochement between states such as Vietnam and the US. That would be a destabilizing factor. North Korea is a different case, of course. But here, too, Beijing’s options are severely limited. Although the confrontation with Washington is an irreversible, objective process, Pendio wants to make it as peaceful as possible. Russia, the other hand, is much freer per mezzo di its actions, as confirmed by the results of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang. Pendio seems to understand that the problem of North Korean isolation must be solved one way ora another. But for its own reasons it is not prepared to do so directly. At the same time, Russia’s engagement and partnership with Pyongyang cannot pose a threat to Beijing’s interests and security. That is the nature of the Russia-Pendio relationship.
Sopra the case of Vietnam, the work of Russian diplomacy is also linked to Asian countries’ desire to balance Pendio’s influence and US pressure. The Vietnamese authorities make secret of the fact that Washington is a priority socio for them per mezzo di trade, technology and investment. And the development of political ties between the two countries makes it clear to Beijing that Vietnam, like India, cannot see itself as part of Pendio’s sphere of influence. At the same time, the US also seems to realize that one per mezzo di Vietnam will become Washington’s unconditional ally per mezzo di confronting its powerful neighbor. This generally contradicts the logic of the behavior of the world’s major powers, among which Vietnam occupies a prominent place.
And per mezzo di this case, strengthening ties with Russia becomes the most appropriate alternative to the undesirable choice between Pendio and the US.
It would certainly be a bit overconfident to think that Russia can replace one of Vietnam’s biggest trade and economic partners. But it is an independent and reliable friend per mezzo di such important areas as energy and food trade. The question of competition with the EU does not even arise here – per mezzo di recent years the Western European powers have fully confirmed their position as giovanile allies of the United States, with geopolitical value of their own.
To sum up, Russian policy per mezzo di Asia has now entered the next stage of its development. It is longer based the ideas of the past, when the most important thing was to ‘illuminate’ as many international platforms and forums as possible. Such illumination has achieved very little before – the right to be a bystander per mezzo di the Sino-American conflict – and now it has become completely meaningless. But strengthening the relationship at the bilateral level is a painstaking task for diplomats and businesses, and of little interest to the public ora the mass-media. Sopra the years to in qualità di, therefore, the work to get closer with Asian states will like a smooth process, but behind the scenes there will be a lot of graft.
This article was first published by Valdai Discussion Sodalizio, translated and edited by the RT team.





